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Abstract
Governments around the world have faced the challenge of how to respond to the
recent outbreak of a novel coronavirus disease (COVID-19). Some have reacted by
greatly restricting the freedom of citizens, while others have opted for less drastic
policies. In this paper, I draw a parallel with vaccination ethics to conceptualize two
distinct approaches to COVID-19 that I call altruistic and lockdown. Given that the
individual measures necessary to limit the spread of the virus can in principle be
achieved voluntarily as well as through enforcement, the question arises of how much
freedom governments ought to give citizens to adopt the required measures. I argue that
an altruistic approach is preferable on moral grounds: it preserves important citizen
freedoms, avoids a number of potential injustices, and gives people a much-needed
sense of meaning in precarious times.
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“The world can understand well enough the process of perishing for want of
food: perhaps few persons can enter into or follow out that of going mad from
solitary confinement.”
Charlotte Brontë, Villette, 323
Introduction
The recent outbreak of a novel coronavirus disease (COVID-19) caused by the severe
acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) was classified as a pandemic
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by the World Health Organization (WHO) on 11 March 2020. Given the unavailability
of either a vaccine or a cure in the aftermath of the outbreak, governments around the
world have faced the challenge of how best to respond so as to curb the spread of the
virus. Since little is currently known about COVID-19, no single course of action has
been unequivocally recommended by epidemiologists, virologists, and other experts.
The Chinese government responded to the outbreak in the city of Wuhan, where the
virus first appeared in December 2019, by practically shutting down life in the city. The
implementation of a lockdown of this kind, which has subsequently been followed by
other nations—most notably Italy, which witnessed the first major outbreak of the
novel coronavirus in Europe—has been the subject of much discussion in the media
and elsewhere. The focus, however, has been more on whether or not a lockdown is
(likely to be) effective, than on the ethical issues that such a severe and far-reaching
response raises.
In this paper, I want to examine the morality of a lockdown response to COVID-19.
In order to do so, I draw a parallel to recent work on vaccination ethics, where the goal
of protecting vulnerable third parties through vaccination has been argued to be
achievable, at least in principle, either by leaving people free to vaccinate for the sake
of others or by taking the decision out of their hands and enforcing it in some way. I
conceptualize two roughly analogous approaches to the COVID-19 pandemic: an
altruistic approach and a lockdown approach.1 The fundamental difference between
the approaches is whether or not people are left at least some freedom to take upon
themselves the necessary measures in light of the pandemic. A lockdown approach
permits freedom of movement outside of the home only for what are judged to be the
most strictly necessary activities, whereas an altruistic approach preserves at least some
freedoms beyond essential undertakings.2
At least in principle, an altruistic approach is able to achieve the goals of an enforced
lockdown. According to a recent modeling study, for instance, individual adoption of
handwashing, mask-wearing, and social distancing can be an effective strategy to
mitigate COVID-19; in fact, self-imposed measures were found to be able to prevent
a large epidemic if efficacy exceeded 50% (Teslya et al. 2020).3 Assuming that the aim
of COVID-19 measures is to drastically reduce the spread of the virus, or what has
come to be known as flattening the curve, then what is needed is for people to follow
the requisite procedures that will lead to the desired outcomes (i.e., self-isolating when
infected, careful attention to personal hygiene, social distancing,4 and so on), which can
in principle be achieved freely as well as through enforcement. Flattening the curve
refers to community isolation measures, which, over time and compared to no inter-
vention, are meant to slow the acceleration of new cases, to reduce the peak number of
cases, and to decrease demands on hospitals and other health care infrastructure
1 I introduce them to address the recent COVID-19 pandemic, but the approaches—and the moral issues that
they raise—may also be usefully applied to other disease outbreaks, both past and future.
2 What constitutes an essential activity may be a matter of some interpretation and may vary between
countries. It is certainly up for debate, and will likely be a political decision; governments decide what
citizens still need to be able to do, in which activities that may still engage, and so on.
3 It must be noted that this model included short-term government-imposed social distancing, rather than self-
imposed social distancing.
4 I prefer the term “physical” to “social” distancing, because it importantly avoids connotations of reduced
sociality. However, the term has stuck since it was first introduced, so I will adopt it throughout this paper.
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(Specktor 2020). Another way in which this has been formulated is in terms of R0, the
basic reproduction number (or ratio) of the virus. R0 represents “the number of cases
that are expected to occur on average in a homogeneous population as a result of
infection by a single individual, when the population is susceptible at the start of an
epidemic, before widespread immunity starts to develop and before any attempt has
been made at immunization”; if R0 is greater than 1, the virus will spread exponentially,
whereas if R0 is less than 1, the virus will spread more slowly and gradually die out
(Aronson et al. 2020). Two crucial aims here are to minimize morbidity and mortality
among the most vulnerable members of society and to ensure that health care systems
are not overwhelmed by the number of cases requiring critical care.
To this end, adopting the necessary measures means that people will have to
take on burdens—some more substantial than others. Additionally, in most cases,
those burdens will have to be borne by people not primarily for their own sake,
but for the sake of others. This is because the majority of citizens will not be
members of the group of people who are most vulnerable (e.g., the elderly, the
chronically ill, the immunosuppressed). An appeal to self-interest here is unlikely
to provide sufficient motivation to take the appropriate measures. Given the goal
of preventing the spread of the virus as much as possible, especially in order to
protect the most vulnerable people, an important question thus emerges: To what
extent ought governments to allow citizens the freedom to take upon themselves
the necessary measures in response to COVID-19? The juxtaposition of lockdown
and altruistic approaches as normative strategies provides the framework from
which I will address this question.
I proceed as follows. First, I develop the analogy to vaccination approaches in order
to show their usefulness for a discussion about the morality of government approaches
to COVID-19. Second, I describe the two approaches—lockdown and altruistic—in
turn, providing examples from nations that have implemented one or the other. Finally,
I make a case for the moral value of taking an altruistic as opposed to a lockdown
approach, focusing on the domains of freedom and justice.
Ultimately, I argue that an altruistic approach is morally preferable because it
conserves some important freedoms and at least partly avoids injustices and harms
associated with a lockdown approach.5 If an altruistic approach is found to insuffi-
ciently serve the public health goal of curbing the spread of the virus and protecting
vulnerable members of society—if people do not take personal responsibility and fail to
heed the call to take appropriate measures to flatten the curve—then the move toward a
lockdown approach may appear warranted, perhaps even necessary. Nevertheless, the
moral problems raised by a lockdown approach should neither be ignored nor
downplayed, and it will still be better to introduce more stringent measures into a
basically altruistic approach than to resort to locking down. Even if a lockdown is
effective in reducing the spread of the virus, there are still reasons to favor an altruistic
approach on moral grounds.
5 It may appear straightforward that an approach that preserves freedom is preferable to one that does not, but
governments might choose (and, I think, some have chosen) a lockdown without necessarily (1) realizing fully
the moral costs of doing so and (2) considering investing instead in the alternative that I outline in this paper.
Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pressing me on this point.
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Approaches to COVID-19
With the ultimate goal of limiting interpersonal contact as much as possible, especially
in order to prevent vulnerable members of society from contracting the virus, the
situation presented by the spread of COVID-19 parallels a dilemma that I have
previously identified in relation to people vaccinating for the sake of
others (Kraaijeveld 2020). What could—or should—governments do in order to
increase the uptake of vaccines that do not necessarily benefit most those who would
take them, but which would contribute to protecting vulnerable members of society?
On the one hand, governments could rely on people to realize the importance of
vaccinating (e.g., against influenza) in order to help protect vulnerable others (e.g.,
the elderly or immunocompromised)—even if for many people, it is the case that they
personally do not stand to benefit most from the vaccine (e.g., if they are healthy young
people). On the other hand, governments could decide not to rely on people’s other-
regarding motives in these matters. This becomes a more pressing issue when vacci-
nation uptake is too low to establish or maintain herd immunity—that is, when people,
left to their own inclinations, are not vaccinating sufficiently on the whole to achieve
the public health goal of protecting vulnerable people.6 Governments could then opt for
a more proactive approach to vaccination, in order to explicitly increase vaccine
coverage. This could be achieved through a range of methods, including more coercive
measures (e.g., fines or exclusion from certain activities) and even compulsion. I have
called an approach that leaves people free to decide to vaccinate for the sake of others
an altruistic approach, while a more hands-on option, where governments are proac-
tively involved in the decisions of citizens, I have called an indirect
approach (Kraaijeveld 2020). In drawing a parallel to COVID-19, I will keep the term
“altruistic” for the first kind of approach, while, for the sake of clarity, I will call the
second kind “lockdown.”
These ideas from vaccination ethics will thus form the conceptual basis of the
approaches that I describe in the following sections. Of course, once a vaccine for
COVID-19 is found, this dilemma will readily present itself in relation to vaccines
again. For, in order to protect those who are likely to suffer the most serious compli-
cations from COVID-19, a large number of those who are unlikely to suffer as much
will likely need to be vaccinated (e.g., a sufficient number of younger people in order to
establish herd immunity for those who cannot become vaccinated—like the immuno-
suppressed). This is an important subject for discussion, but one that I will not pursue
here.7
The dynamic that underlies the considerations behind vaccination and the potential
approaches to vaccinating for the sake of third parties to which they give rise thus
6 One might think that vulnerable people ought simply to be vaccinated, thus eliminating the risk of infection
altogether. However, aside from the fact that not all vaccines offer complete protection against a disease, so
that a vulnerable person who is vaccinated will additionally benefit from the presence of herd immunity (as it
further decreases their chance of becoming ill), there are groups of people who cannot be vaccinated. Among
those are, for instance, infants who are too young, people who are immunosuppressed (e.g., those undergoing
chemotherapy), and people who are allergic to particular vaccines.
7 For some relevant literature in this area, however, see Bambery et al. (2018) on vaccinating children—rather
than healthcare professionals and individuals in high-risk groups—against influenza; and see Giubilini et al.
(2020) on vaccinating the young in order to protect the old in the case of a COVID-19 vaccine.
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translates to the current situation, where governments try to decide how best to respond
to the COVID-19 pandemic. However, instead of having to decide how to regulate
vaccination so as to ensure that more vulnerable people are protected by those less so,
the dilemma now centers on how to regulate the adoption of relevant curve-flattening
measures toward the same end. In the face of COVID-19, how should governments act
in order to safeguard society’s most vulnerable populations and maintain the function-
ing of health care systems?
I want to clarify that I do not wish to give the impression that there have been, or that
there possibly are, only two ways in which governments could respond to the pan-
demic. The two approaches will, to some extent, serve as ideal types. That they should
do so makes sense; although I will provide empirical examples to give real-world
content to the approaches, my main purpose in conceptualizing them is normative,
namely to provide an answer to the question of whether a lockdown approach is
morally justified—and therefore should or should not be taken by governments—in
light of an alternative, altruistic approach.
Within the larger scheme of things, what one finds is that the question of what
governments ought to do to halt the spread of the novel coronavirus has concentrated
on whether or not they ought to enforce a complete lockdown like China did in the city
of Wuhan, or whether they should instead allow citizens to retain at least some degree
of freedom of movement, decision-making about their activities, and so on. It is this
question concerning the freedom of citizens—especially the freedom to engage in at
least some non-essential activities—that I wish to capture through my discussion of the
different approaches.
Lockdown Approach
Perhaps the most conspicuous approach to the COVID-19 pandemic has been the
locking down of cities and even entire countries. The precedent of shutting down
virtually all public life and of people being largely confined to their homes was set by
Chinese authorities in the city of Wuhan. In Europe, Italy followed suit after experienc-
ing the first major outbreak on the continent. Since then, a number of other countries
around the world have opted to lock down. A lockdown, also known as a stay-at-home
order, generally disallows all but the most essential activities for the general public
(e.g., going to the supermarket, pharmacy, hospital). A great many aspects of regular
public life will be affected, even while the operations of vital work and services will
often be maintained. Public (and even private) modes of transportation will frequently
be halted or reduced in numbers and/or operating hours, while restaurants, cafés, bars,
shops, hairdressers, gyms, and numerous other places of public entertainment and
services will frequently be closed. For my account, the shutting down of these public
places and activities is not decisive in distinguishing the two approaches. The crucial
element is whether citizens are free to stay home and to take at least some of the
required COVID-19 measures upon themselves, or whether this is enforced.8 An
altruistic approach can be compatible, for instance, with the closing down of most
public places, as long as citizens are still free to leave their homes for some non-
8 An additional element of the altruistic approach is that governments stress the importance of citizens taking
the necessary measures, even if these are not enforced. I will discuss this in more detail later.
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essential activities. On the other hand, it appears unlikely that a lockdown approach
would not entail much of public life grinding to a halt, given that citizens have to
remain home in any case.
Importantly, a lockdown has to be enforced through state power in order to be
effective, so that certain acts will become criminalized. Fines will be introduced, and
the threat of detainment, arrest, and in some cases even jailtime will be utilized to
ensure that citizens do not flout the terms of the lockdown (whatever these may be). In
this way, a lockdown approach occupies an extreme point on a spectrum where on the
other end lies a laissez-faire policy that allows people to do exactly as they otherwise
would (i.e., before COVID-19).
The following examples are not meant to provide a complete list of all the countries
that have so far enforced a lockdown, nor is it supposed to be exhaustive of all aspects
of public and private life that have been affected. I focus on three particular countries
that have taken lockdown approaches, in respective chronological order: China (spe-
cifically Wuhan), Italy, and France. My purpose in doing so is to illustrate the
lockdown approach and to provide a general sense of what it involves.
One report describes the situation in Wuhan after the lockdown as follows. “The
streets … are eerily quiet. The city of 11 million people, the center of the coronavirus
outbreak, has been locked down since 23 January,9 with all public transport, flights and
trains suspended. ‘You pretty much don’t see anybody outside,’ says a man who lives
in Wuhan… Private vehicles are banned in the downtown area. Highways are shut so
residents aren’t able to leave the city” (Lu 2020, 7).
A similar picture emerges in Italy, which was the first European country to imple-
ment unprecedented lockdown measures so as “to restrict citizens’ mobility and try to
contain the COVID-19 epidemic, rapidly escalating to more aggressive interventions to
reduce social mixing and interrupt transmission chains,” through a range of policies
“from school closure, advice against traveling or even banning non-authorized trips to
and from areas with sustained transmission, university closure, ban of large-scale and
public events, and then of any social gatherings, closure of museums, increasing
restrictions on the opening hours of restaurants and bars, and encouraging or mandating
smart/remote working whenever possible,” with nearly every day seeing “new and
stricter policies … in an increasing number of Italian provinces” until finally, on
March 10, “the whole country [was] under lockdown” (Pepe et al. 2020, 2).
In France, a lockdown was also instated. It became official on 17 March, and meant
that “all non-essential outings [were] outlawed and [could] draw a fine of up to €135
($148)” (Regan et al. 2020).
The upshot of these measures has been that, unless people have something justifi-
ably urgent to do—and activities often do have to be justified, for instance by having to
carry a document that indicates one’s reason for leaving home—people must remain
inside their homes, at the threat of punishment.10 That is, the behavior that is needed to
flatten the curve (i.e., social distancing, self-isolation, and so on) becomes enforced. In
this way, people are not, or no longer, free to act as they see fit given the situation. To
9 All dates in this section refer to the year 2020.
10 This is assuming that people have homes. The question of how—and perhaps especially how not—to treat
homeless people during the COVID-19 pandemic is a very important one, which nevertheless lies outside of
the scope of this paper.
Asian Bioethics Review
clarify: people under lockdown can violate lockdown rules, thus exercising their
agency to some extent. They are still free to not follow the lockdown rules, even
though this will likely come at a significant cost (e.g., through fines or even arrest).
They can still choose to accept whatever consequences are at stake. However, under a
lockdown, people are no longer free to decide to follow the measures required to flatten
the curve for the sake of other people. There is no real choice to do the right thing,
when doing the right thing is enforced—when not doing the right thing means that you
will be punished. This is an important point, for reasons that I will discuss in more
detail later.
Altruistic Approach
Whereas a lockdown precludes all non-essential activities, an altruistic approach can in
principle achieve the same goals of flattening the curve, while letting citizens keep at
least some of their regular (i.e., pre-pandemic) freedoms. The term “altruistic” here
refers not to the motives of the governments that would select such an approach—the
approach itself is not altruistic—but to the space that governments leave citizens to
behave in other-regarding ways that are necessary to prevent the spread of the virus. A
different way of formulating it is that under a lockdown approach, citizens are
compelled to act in ways that will collectively protect vulnerable others, while an
altruistic approach allows citizens at least some freedom toward that end. This is an
important difference between the two approaches, which is clearly relevant for any
justification of the approaches from a public health ethics perspective.
When one speaks of altruism, the question of what exactly it means quickly arises.
There is much debate in the philosophical and other literature about how to best
understand the concept (Scott and Seglow 2007). I do not wish to get caught up here
in a discussion about definitions. My conception of altruism is minimal; it involves
doing something for someone else (or for a group of others) primarily for the latter’s
sake. This will often entail taking on some kind of burden, which may be more or less
significant. In extreme cases, altruism may take the form of self-sacrifice, but it does
not have to. Some have argued that self-sacrifice is required for an act to be truly
altruistic, but I disagree.11 I think that doing something for others—primarily for their
sake—even when this is done at the cost of only a relatively small burden, is properly
understood as an altruistic act. Altruism is not necessarily heroic; if we reserve the
notion only for heroic acts, then we will both find and be able to ask very little of it.
More concretely, within the present discussion, altruistic behavior is exemplified by the
things that people do to avoid spreading COVID-19, primarily for the sake of others
(i.e., to protect vulnerable people, to lighten the burden on health care workers, and so
on). Of course, self-interest will be involved. People do not wish to become ill
themselves, and people want a properly functioning health care system for when they
should require critical care. Yet stressing self-interest is unlikely to be sufficiently
motivating across the board, because, as I have indicated earlier, the majority of people
are not going to become very ill or die from the virus. Low-risk groups, like healthy
teenagers, quite simply do not face the same stakes as the elderly or the chronically ill
11 For an overview of positions on altruism, see Kraut (2020).
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do when they are exposed to COVID-19. These groups of low-risk and otherwise
mobile and active people would therefore stay home primarily for the sake of others.
While a lockdown approach tends to be categorical (either a lockdown is in place or
it is not), an altruistic approach can vary in terms of how many restrictions are
introduced—as long as some basic non-essential freedom-preserving activities are
retained. It allows more variation and tweaking in terms of specific policies. A
lockdown approach does not have this kind of leeway; it is the all in the all-or-
nothing approach, as has been demonstrated by countries like China and Italy in their
respective lockdowns. Importantly, an altruistic approach does not mean that every-
thing remains as it was before the outbreak of the virus; the guiding assumption in light
of COVID-19 has been that governments do need to take some kind of action to curb
the spread of the virus. An altruistic approach means that governments do proactively
engage the public with regard to the importance of taking measures to flatten the curve,
so as to protect vulnerable people and health care systems.12 Knowledge about the
coronavirus and about the measures that can be taken against its spread needs to be
disseminated among the public. In fact, for the approach to be properly altruistic in my
sense of the term, and not simply a hands-off approach, governments have to stress
precisely what citizens could and ought to do in order to flatten the curve and to help
one another get through the pandemic.
When an altruistic approach is adopted, citizens are left free in some ways, then, to
act responsibly. This remaining freedom could be something as relatively small (yet
still significant) as being allowed to go outside for a leisurely stroll whenever one
wants, rather than merely to perform a narrowly defined goal-directed activity, like
going to the supermarket or pharmacy. These still-allowed activities can be paired with
suitable guidelines, like making sure to keep an appropriate amount of distance from
other people (e.g., the 1.5-meter rule). Again, the crucial point is that people are still
allowed to do things in public spaces that are not very narrowly defined as essential.
The altruistic approach maps onto some policies that countries have already taken in
response to COVID-19. In the Netherlands, for example, the National Institute for
Public Health and the Environment (RIVM) has formulated three potential approaches
to combat COVID-19 as part of their advice to the Dutch House of Representatives.
These approaches are as follows: (1) no intervention, (2) maximum control, and (3)
lockdown.13 The approaches that I have described roughly correspond to the latter two,
with a lockdown being equivalent to my conception of it, and a “maximum control”
approach resembling an altruistic approach in the demands that it makes of citizens and
the freedom that it leaves them. I do not describe taking no action (no intervention) as
an approach, because I think that it is clear that some intervention is required by
governments of countries where infections have appeared. A discussion of the morality
of taking no action whatsoever would seem to me to be rather short: it is the wrong
approach. Even in a country like Sweden, which has taken a relatively hands-off
approach to COVID-19 (leaving most public places open), the government has never-
theless been proactive with regard to communicating the need for social distancing.
12 In a manner similar to how governments should highlight the importance of vaccinating for others even
without enforcing such vaccination (Author Self Identifying Reference).
13 For an overview (in Dutch), see: https://www.tweedekamer.nl/sites/default/files/atoms/files/20200325_
briefing_coronavirus_tweede_kamer_presentatie_rivm.pdf
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This highlights the need for governments to robustly inform and engage with the public
when opting for an altruistic approach.
At the time of writing, the Netherlands has decided against a lockdown and has
opted for maximum control or, in the current terminology, an altruistic as opposed to a
lockdown approach.14 The dual goal of this approach is to protect vulnerable groups of
people and to maintain the integrity of the health care system, which it aims to
accomplish without locking down.
Under an altruistic approach, governments should stress the importance of solidarity
and of helping others, of the need to make sacrifices for the greater good, of taking
personal responsibility for the necessary measures to protect oneself and others against
the virus, and so on. Numerous means of persuasion and non-coercive measures to
motivate citizens to act so as to flatten the curve can and should be employed. Such
means have, in fact, been used widely and creatively in places like the Netherlands.
Government and health officials have taken this line by publicly emphasizing the need
for solidarity and by encouraging people to act responsibly, and through television
commercials and social media have underscored the importance of staying at home and
protecting others. In this way, an attempt was made to offer people (1) knowledge of
what needs to be done (e.g., stay home as much as possible), (2) an understanding of
why this is necessary, with an emphasis on altruism and solidarity (i.e., to help flatten
the curve), and (3) a sense of personal responsibility to make sure that one adheres to
the necessary measures and implements the required changes.
Of course, leaving people free to decide how to act can result in the desired
behavior (i.e., altruism and solidarity), but it may also lead to undesired behavior (i.e.,
selfishness and disregard for public health measures). This is why it is not enough for
a government to do nothing—there needs to be a proactive, guiding approach that
makes it very clear what is being asked of people and why it matters that they pay
heed to the advice. Desired norms should be accentuated, and, in all of this, relevant
insights from social psychology and related disciplines can and should be utilized (cf.
Van Bavel et al. 2020).
In Sweden, a relatively relaxed approach to COVID-19 has been taken, as
schools, gyms, bars, and restaurants have been left open throughout the crisis to
date. Nevertheless, the government has urged citizens to behave responsibly and to
follow the proper social distancing guidelines (Rolander 2020). Sweden’s approach
is considered paradigmatic for its lack of stringent measures. While there is some
evidence that the Swedish COVID-19 approach was able to “achieve results highly
similar to late-onset stringent mandates” (Kamerlin and Kasson 2020), there is also
evidence that the relatively laissez-faire approach ultimately resulted in a significant
increase in mortality especially among the vulnerable (Habib 2020). More data is
required to ascertain the specific consequences of different approaches. For now,
however, the Swedish case at least suggests that much can be achieved by means of
voluntary measures (Kavaliunas et al. 2020).
14 The “maximum control” approach was later called an “intelligent lockdown” by the Dutch government.
Terminology matters, of course, yet for the purpose of this paper what is decisive is not what an approach is
called locally, but what it means for citizens—especially with regard to the freedoms that it permits. For more
information regarding the decision, see (in Dutch): https://www.tweedekamer.nl/sites/default/files/atoms/files/
20200325_briefing_coronavirus_tweede_kamer_presentatie_rivm.pdf
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The paths taken by the Netherlands and Sweden might appear very different if one
focuses on public spaces, because in the Netherlands most restaurants and places of
entertainment have been shut down in response to the coronavirus. However, my
conception of an altruistic approach unites the two cases: while there has been more
loss of freedom in the Netherlands compared to Sweden, fundamentally the two nations
have taken the same approach by not opting for a lockdown, and by allowing people
freedom of movement while at the same time emphasizing the need for people to be
responsible and to show solidarity with others. It is important to keep this point in
mind, especially throughout the following sections, where I will argue that it is
ultimately better for governments to include stricter measures within an altruistic
approach than to go so far as locking down.
Moral Issues
I will focus on a number of issues broadly within two moral domains—freedom and
justice—in order to show why the lockdown approach is problematic and why an
altruistic approach to COVID-19 is the morally preferable policy for governments.15
Freedom
The most obvious feature of a lockdown is the restriction of freedom that it entails. This
is inherent in the concept of a lockdown, which requires that people stay put where they
are. When a stay-at-home order is enforced by the state, citizens are prevented from
leaving their homes at their own discretion. Freedom of movement is an important
human good, so that infringing on it is problematic from a moral point of view. In fact,
freedom of movement is so important that Article 13 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights states that everyone “has the right to freedom of movement … within
the borders of each state” (United Nations 1948). This notion was later taken up in
Article 12 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which
incorporates the human right to freedom of movement into treaty law, stating that
“everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that territory, have the
right to liberty of movement” (United Nations General Assembly 1966). When gov-
ernments refuse citizens the right to move freely within the country, this constitutes a
violation of their basic human rights. As such, a lockdown should not be taken lightly.
There may be some situations in which restricting freedom of movement is
nonetheless justified. Article 12 of the ICCPR, for instance, includes a proviso that
the right to freedom of movement may be subject to restrictions; among other
things, the right can be restricted when doing so is necessary to protect public
health (United Nations General Assembly 1966). A recent policy brief developed
by the WHO Working Group on Ethics & SARS-CoV-2 (2020, 1) reiterates the
idea that “it can be legitimate in some circumstances to introduce restrictions for
the sake of protecting the health of the public”. The idea of restricting freedom in
15 I focus on these two not because they are the only areas of moral concern, but because I have to prioritize
given limited space. Where relevant, I will touch briefly on other morally relevant matters (like privacy). I
leave it to others to develop these and other moral issues more fully.
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order to protect public health is linked to a widely acknowledged prima facie
grounds for limiting an individual’s freedom, namely when that individual’s
behavior is likely to cause harm to third parties (Holland 2015). As John Stuart
Mill (1859/2003, 80) originally formulated the idea, “the only purpose for which
power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community,
against his will, is to prevent harm to others”. According to this line of reasoning,
also known as the harm principle, preventing harm to others is a sufficient reason
to limit the freedom of a person who might cause such harm. Relating this idea to
the present situation, one might think that stopping citizens from leaving their
homes prevents them from spreading the virus, and thus causing harm to others, so
that limiting their freedom is justified according to the harm principle.
This conclusion is hasty. Lockdown orders are among the most extreme
measures that a government can take, since they are the most restrictive of
freedom, and the harm principle does not entail that, if there is some chance of
harm being caused, then the severest measures are automatically justified. There
needs to be some sense of proportionality, a reasonable weighing of means and
ends (cf. Giubilini and Savulescu 2020). An important principle here is that of
the least restrictive means, which holds that “public health measures should
interfere with the autonomous freedom of individuals to the least possible or
necessary extent” (Byskov 2019, 511). In relation to COVID-19 measures, harm
might still be avoided under certain conditions that do not go as far in their
restriction of individual freedom as a lockdown. For instance, while mass
gatherings may be limited, given that the risk is high of the virus spreading
and causing harm under those conditions and there are currently no alternative
ways to safely accommodate mass assemblies of people, citizens might still be
left free to go outside for a walk, say, simply to stretch their legs and breathe
some fresh air, as long as they keep an appropriate distance from others. In this
way, harm can reasonably be prevented without governments entirely
encroaching upon citizens’ freedom of movement. The recent modeling study
showing that individual adoption of handwashing, mask-wearing, and social
distancing can prevent a large epidemic if efficacy exceeded 50% (Teslya
et al. 2020) is important to consider here, as all of those measures could be
taken by citizens under an altruistic approach. An altruistic approach that is
sensitive to harm prevention and to flattening the curve is morally preferable to
a lockdown approach because it preserves at least a basic freedom of movement.
One potential issue that is related to the issue of freedom of movement concerns the
matter of privacy. One consequence of a lockdown is that it necessitates enforcement. If
a government decrees that citizens are not allowed to leave their homes except for
absolutely necessary activities or via special exceptions, then it follows that ways of
overseeing and enforcing the decree are required, especially if violations of lockdown
orders are to constitute criminal offences. That is, when citizens are not merely
encouraged but positively required by law to stay home, the question of control arises.
How will governments ensure that citizens actually stay home? There seems to be a
slippery slope here toward increasingly invasive forms of government surveillance and
privacy violations. An altruistic approach makes the need for surveillance less pressing,
although even when people are allowed some freedom of movement, there may be
some monitoring by governments to make sure that people adhere to whatever
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conditions have been stipulated.16 Yet the kind of control that one currently sees in
Italy, for instance, where citizens have to justify to local authorities why they are
leaving their homes (through documentation known as autocertificazione) is unthink-
able under an altruistic approach. Perhaps it is not inevitable that citizens have to justify
their (otherwise innocuous) movements to the state under a lockdown, but it should
worry us that the lockdown approach taken by a democratic country like Italy has
resulted in such a state of affairs.
There are also more pragmatic reasons to limit citizens’ freedoms as little as
possible. A lockdown is a heavy burden to bear, and it is unlikely that people will be
able to keep up being shut inside their homes for a long stretch of time. Reactance (also
known as “lockdown fatigue”) may very well develop to lockdown measures; in fact,
there have been widely publicized protests against lockdowns in the USA as well as in
a number of European countries like France and Germany. Even citizens who are
initially prepared to make sacrifices may eventually tire of overly strict measures.
Given that COVID-19 may be with us for a considerable while longer, governments
have to consider carefully how best to ensure that citizens can take reasonable measures
against the virus in a sustainable way, without needlessly exhausting endurance. There
is some tentative evidence, based on an analysis of Google Trends, which suggests that
lockdowns around the world have substantially increased the search intensity for terms
like boredom, worry, and loneliness (Brodeur et al. 2020). Although this is admittedly
speculative, given that there is currently no data (as far as I know), I would suggest that
being allowed to go outside for leisure—and not merely for the essential tasks—will
make other COVID-19 measures more bearable, and is likely to lead to less boredom,
among other things, than when staying home is strictly enforced. Empirical research in
this area is needed.
I have so far focused on the idea of freedom largely to argue against a lockdown
approach. I want to make a final point regarding freedom here that speaks more
positively to the direct moral value of an altruistic approach. There is a normative
argument to be made for giving people the space to be altruistic and for allowing them
to express solidarity with their fellow human beings, especially during a time of crisis.
Freedom is necessary for altruism; the two concepts are intimately linked, because
altruism depends on the proper kind of self-chosen motive (Seglow 2004). Differently
put, if someone has no choice but to act a certain way, then the way in which one acts
cannot be altruistic. Without freedom, there is no responsibility. Once a lockdown is
enforced, room for altruism in this area is more or less squeezed out of society. There
will be much less space, if any, for people to act based on other-regarding motives.
Choosing to self-isolate for the sake of others can give meaning to one’s situation. It
can make it more bearable to stay home if one knows that one is doing it by choice and
for good reasons. I think that this is an important but underappreciated point.
There is empirical support for this idea. In a series of three studies, Klein (2016)
found that people who engaged in prosocial behaviors (like volunteering or spending
16 Of course, under an altruistic approach, privacy concerns are still likely to arise during the pandemic.
Tracking people’s movements and health conditions may be part of public health measures against the virus,
even apart from whether or not there is a lockdown (or perhaps even as a condition to prevent a lockdown). It
still appears to me that, as far as controlling individual movement goes, there is reason to think that a lockdown
approach stands to exacerbate privacy concerns in the manner that I have outlined. Thanks to an anonymous
reviewer for raising this point.
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money to benefit others) subsequently reported experiencing a greater sense of meaning
and purpose in their lives. Seeing one’s life as meaningful is crucial to human
existence; it is associated with greater longevity (Krause 2009), better physical health
(Taylor et al. 2000; Hooker et al. 2018), and reduced depression, anxiety, and overall
psychological distress (Debats et al. 1993). Prosocial behavior has also been linked to
greater psychological flourishing (Nelson et al. 2016) as well as an increase in well-
being and vitality—even in the absence of direct contact with a beneficiary (Martela
and Ryan 2016). Altruistic attitudes, volunteering, and informal helping behaviors were
also found to uniquely contribute to the maintenance of life satisfaction, positive affect,
and psychological well-being among retirement community member dwellers (Kahana
et al. 2013). Although none of this research was conducted during the COVID-19
pandemic or a similar state of affairs, it stands to reason that people who remain at
home for the sake of others will experience a greater sense of meaning and purpose
compared to those whose staying at home is strictly enforced by the state. The actions
of people who take measures upon themselves, because they know that they are thereby
helping others, can experience a sense of meaning that those who are doing the same at
the risk of punishment cannot. This line of reasoning again suggests the importance for
governments of actively promoting and fostering the kind of prosocial behaviors that
are not only necessary for a collective response to COVID-19 but which also stand to
offer people a much-needed sense of meaning in existentially uncertain times.
Respect for autonomy—for allowing people to make their own decisions and decide
how to live their lives—is an important moral principle in and of itself (Beauchamp and
Childress 2012). It is a principle that is seriously challenged by a lockdown approach. I
suggest that, as much as it is problematic for freedom and autonomy to be undermined
by a lockdown, it is also especially good to offer people a window through which to act
for the sake of others. It can give people a sense of meaning and purpose, which is
always good but particularly so during a time of global crisis. This is another reason
why governments ought to favor an altruistic approach.
Having discussed several matters concerning freedom, I will now address some
issues related to justice.
Justice
Only in hindsight will we be able to more fully assess the negative ramifications of the
COVID-19 pandemic. As things stand, it is clear that the virus is having a detrimental
impact on the lives of a great many people around the world, even if only indirectly—
through the global economic consequences of the crisis, for instance. In countries
where far-reaching measures have been taken in response to the pandemic, citizens
have to bear not only the burdens of the virus itself but also (and perhaps especially) the
particular burdens of the imposed measures. Generally speaking, the stricter the
measures, the greater will their impact be on people’s everyday lives.
I want to focus here on one area of justice, namely the fair distribution of the burdens
associated with COVID-19 measures. One might think that a general lockdown is
eminently democratic: after all, everyone—rich and poor, young and old—has to stay
at home. However, this is far from the case. When citizens are confined to their homes,
there are reasons to consider it very unlikely that the burdens of a lockdown will be
fairly distributed among the population. More specifically, there are at least two ways in
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which a lockdown approach can be unjust, in the sense that the burdens of the measures
will be experienced disproportionately more acutely by some individuals and groups
than by others.
First, there is what might be called the unequal home conditions argument. Home
conditions for citizens are bound to vary greatly, so that some people are much more
likely to suffer from having to stay home than others. For instance, while having to
remain at home for long periods of time is tough on anyone, it is bound to be much
more burdensome for people of lower socioeconomic status than for those of higher
economic status. The very rich will tend to have access to comfortable accommoda-
tions, plenty of living space in which to spend their time, gardens for fresh air and
exercise, and so on. At the same time, those who are less well-off will often find
themselves confined to small apartments, perhaps even single rooms, with little chance
of getting fresh air. After all, especially in large industrialized cities, gardens and
balconies are a luxury. Those who are more well-off are likely to be able to live
comfortably and independently for a significant stretch of time, having the means to
afford all sorts of deliveries of goods, online means of entertainment, and so on. The
least well-off, on the other hand, are often dependent on others in important ways: on
the kindness of friends and family for help getting by, on food banks, and so
on. Continued access to these important services by others will not always be
guaranteed.
Other than socioeconomic status, forced isolation will be especially difficult for
other vulnerable members of society. For instance, there is a serious risk that people
with psychological problems (e.g., those suffering from depression or anxiety disor-
ders) will suffer disproportionately from enforced isolation. There is evidence that,
compared to 2018 numbers, US adults at the height of the pandemic in April 2020 were
eight times more likely to fit the criteria for serious mental illness (27.7% vs. 3.4%),
with especially pronounced differences among younger adults and those with children
(Twenge and Joiner 2020). These statistics are not specific to lockdown conditions or to
vulnerable populations, but they do suggest that, if the general population is experienc-
ing increased mental disturbance, then those already at risk are likely to be especially
stricken. A survey assessing mental health outcomes in the Italian general population
three to four weeks into national lockdown measures against COVID-19 found high
rates of negative mental health outcomes; among 18,147 individuals who completed
the questionnaire, endorsement rates for post-traumatic stress symptoms (PTSS) were
6604 (37%), for depression, 3084 (17.3%), for anxiety, 3700 (20.8%), for insomnia,
1301 (7.3%), for high perceived stress, 3895 (22.9%), and for adjustment disorder,
4092 (22.9%) (Rossi et al. 2020). During a lockdown, the anxious stand to become
more anxious, the loneliest even lonelier. People suffering from domestic violence,
which may increase under conditions of isolation, when frustrations increase as outlets
for violence dwindle, may also be at greater risk of being harmed under lockdown
conditions, when they may quite literally have nowhere to go. Part of the logic of a
lockdown is undermined by these considerations: while a lockdown is meant to protect
the most vulnerable members of society, it ends up disproportionally hurting its most
vulnerable populations. That it should do so is unjust.
Second, there is what might be called the unequal geographical disease burden
argument, which is related to the proportionality principle and that of the least
restrictive means. The incidence and impact of COVID-19 is unlikely to be (even
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roughly) equally distributed across geographical regions within a given country. If the
prima facie justification of a lockdown is that it is immediately necessary in order to
prevent the spread of the virus and to flatten the curve, then, assuming this justification
to hold, it will apply most readily to areas where there is a significant amount of
infection that needs to be curbed. It may not be apt, however, for areas where the
incidence and rate of infection is very low. For instance, the decision by the Italian
government to lock down the entire country in response to COVID-19 might, at least
on the surface, appear to be justified from the perspective of parts of the country that
became coronavirus hotspots, like the region of Lombardy. While my arguments
suggest that even in those areas, a lockdown is morally problematic, there is an
additional argument to be made that it might be particularly unjust if such stringent
lockdown measures are also enforced in other regions, like Molise or Basilicata, where
the relative impact of the virus is much smaller.
Of course, there may be reasons to introduce stricter measures in these areas, too
(e.g., to keep infection rates low). Yet, to also enforce a lockdown in little-affected
areas, especially if they are far removed from coronavirus hotspots, still appears to
require more justification than it does in those areas where the virus is rampant. The
Chinese government did not lock down the entire nation in response to the pandemic;
they enforced lockdown measures first in the city of Wuhan, and later in other, more or
less circumscribed areas that saw outbreaks of the virus (like in the province of Jilin).
Had the government enforced measures as strict as those in Wuhan for the entire nation,
one might rightfully have questioned whether this were a just policy, on the grounds
that it would seriously encroach on people’s freedom while other measures, more
respecting of liberty and autonomy, could have been maintained.
This argument admittedly leaves room for local lockdowns in areas greatly affected
by the virus, but I have argued that there are other reasons to think that a lockdown is
unjust. The unequal geographical disease burden argument suggests that a lockdown
approach taken by a government for an entire nation in order to tackle the virus within a
particular region can be unjust in another way.
Conclusion
Governments around the world have needed to respond quickly to the COVID-19
pandemic. If the public health goal is to protect vulnerable people from contracting the
novel coronavirus and to prevent health care systems from being overrun with cases—that
is, if we all need to contribute to flattening the curve—then this poses a dilemma similar to
one that is found in vaccination ethics. The dilemma centers on the question of whether
governments should leave room for people’s altruistic inclinations, or whether they ought
to bypass these and enforce the required measures in some ways. I have conceptualized
two potential approaches to COVID-19, and I have argued that an altruistic approach is
morally preferable to a lockdown approach. An altruistic approach maintains important
citizen freedoms, is more respectful of personal autonomy, is less prone to result in
immediate privacy violations, and avoids a number of injustices. Importantly, this ap-
proach also leaves citizens a greater sense of individual responsibility and freedom to act
on altruistic inclinations, thus allowing them to give meaning to their actions and their
lives during a time when despair over lack of control is a real concern.
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All in all, then, governments ought to favor an altruistic approach on moral grounds.
Given that the approaches are ways of responding to a crisis, and are meant to meet
crucial and ongoing public health goals, there should be room for re-assessment based
on empirical feedback. Should a more permissive altruistic approach that lets people
almost entirely free to take action to flatten the curve fail to result in the necessary
responses, then stricter measures may yet be justified. However, even then, these
measures ought to be introduced within an approach that is in principle altruistic, and
which does not go as far as confining people to their homes all together.
While the different approaches that I have described immediately apply to the
present situation, both in guiding decisions about how to govern and in determining
the morality of policies already taken, the distinction between altruistic and lockdown
approaches will also be relevant to future outbreaks. One hopes, of course, that the
question of how much freedom governments ought to leave citizens in the face of
pandemics never arises again, but it is likely that even after COVID-19 has become a
painful memory, the way in which governments handle such crises will remain a
subject of much concern—including moral.
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